---
slug: vtc/members/rotate-challenge
version: "0.1"
title: VTC Members — Rotate Challenge
summary: Open a DID-rotation ceremony for the calling member and return the challenge bytes to sign with the old and new keys.
status: draft
targetFrameworkVersion: "0.5.0"
category: governance
keywords:
  - vtc
  - members
  - did-rotation
  - challenge
authors:
  - Glenn Gore (https://github.com/stormer78)
parties:
  - role: member
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: issuer
  - role: community maintainer
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: recipient
proofRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: The binding proof for the rotation itself remains the paired old/new signatures presented to vtc/members/rotate — that is unchanged. Opening the ceremony is nonetheless an act taken under the subject's authority against their key material, and an unattributable open lets anyone who can reach the endpoint mint rotation challenges in a member's name, which is a denial-of-rotation and phishing surface even though the challenge alone confers nothing. The proof binds the open to the party entitled to make it.
issuedAtRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: The challenge is issued under the member's authority to rotate, and it is meaningful only while that rotation is still open. Without an issue time a captured challenge stays answerable after the rotation has closed.
sideEffects:
  level: none
  rationale: "Issues a single-use rotation challenge; the ceremony is completed by a separate task."
exposure:
  discloses: none
  actsAsSubject: true
  rationale: "The subject is the authenticated caller acting on their own membership — the task exercises the member's own authority over their own record."
errorCodes:
  - code: vtc/members/rotate-challenge:notMember
    meaning: The authenticated caller is not a member of this community.
    retryable: false
---

## Abstract

The **VTC Members — Rotate Challenge** Trust Task begins a member DID rotation. It returns a `rotationId`, an expiry, the `signingPayloadHex` the member signs with **both** the old and new keys, and the `canonicalTemplate` those signatures cover. The optional `reason` is a self-asserted motive, bound to the session and recorded on the audit envelope — intent, not evidence, and not covered by either signature. The ceremony is completed by [`vtc/members/rotate`](../../rotate/0.1/).

## Conformance

Producer: optionally supply `reason`.

Consumer: verify the caller is a member. Mint a single-use, TTL'd `rotationId` bound to the session, and return the challenge material. Record the `reason` against the pending rotation.

## Security & Privacy

**Challenge only.** This task proves nothing on its own — control of the old and new keys is demonstrated at `vtc/members/rotate`. The challenge is single-use and expires, anchoring replay resistance for the rotation.
