---
slug: vta/credentials/issue
version: "0.1"
title: VTA Credentials — Issue
summary: A context authority issues a scoped, time-boxed Verifiable Credential to a holder after operator step-up approval — the basis for an explicit, revocable cross-context share.
status: draft
targetFrameworkVersion: "0.5.0"
category: credentials
keywords:
  - credentials
  - issuance
  - verifiable-credential
  - scope
  - cross-domain
  - share
  - step-up
  - governance
  - policy
authors:
  - Glenn Gore (https://github.com/stormer78)
parties:
  - role: Issuing authority
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: issuer
  - role: VTA
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: recipient
proofRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: An issuance instruction authorizes the minting of a bearer-usable credential; it is replayed by an auditor and corroborates the resulting credential's provenance, so transport-independent integrity is required. The operator step-up that gates it is itself a separately-verifiable signed artifact.
issuedAtRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: Issuance acts with the subject's authority and returns credential material that leaves the agent's control. A replayed issuance mints a second credential over the same claims, and a holder cannot tell which of the two the subject meant to exist.
sideEffects:
  level: mutating
  rationale: "Issues a scoped, time-boxed credential after step-up approval; revocable."
consequences:
  - "Issues a credential attributable to the context authority; valid until expiry or revocation."
exposure:
  discloses: secret
  actsAsSubject: true
  rationale: >-
    The response carries `credential` — the signed Verifiable Credential itself,
    which the response schema makes REQUIRED — and the caller retains it and can
    present it to any verifier until it expires or is revoked. `actsAsSubject`
    because the credential is minted under the issuing context's own key and
    asserts claims in its name.
errorCodes:
  - code: vta/credentials/issue:holderInvalid
    meaning: The holder identifier is not a resolvable DID.
    retryable: false
  - code: vta/credentials/issue:scopeEmpty
    meaning: The requested claims object is empty — a share must convey at least one claim.
    retryable: false
  - code: vta/credentials/issue:validityTooLong
    meaning: The requested validity exceeds the issuer's maximum.
    retryable: false
    detailsSchema:
      type: object
      additionalProperties: false
      properties:
        requestedSeconds: { type: integer }
        maxSeconds: { type: integer }
  - code: vta/credentials/issue:stepUpRequired
    meaning: The operation requires a higher authentication assurance level (operator step-up) that has not been satisfied.
    retryable: true
  - code: vta/credentials/issue:profileViolation
    meaning: payload.credentialType names a claims profile defined by this specification and payload.claims does not satisfy it (shape mismatch, or a policyHash that does not match the canonicalized policy).
    retryable: false
related:
  - vta/credentials/revoke
  - auth/step-up/approve-response
  - acl/grant
  - credential-exchange/query
  - vtc/endorsements/issue
  - policy/activate
knownImplementations:
  - https://github.com/OpenVTC/verifiable-trust-infrastructure
---

## Abstract

The **VTA Credentials — Issue** Trust Task instructs a VTA to mint a **scoped, time-boxed Verifiable Credential** and bind it to a named *holder*. Unlike the fixed authorization credential minted once at integration bootstrap, this task issues an **arbitrary-claims** credential on demand — the mechanism behind an explicit, revocable **cross-context share**: one context (the *issuing authority*) grants a holder in another context exactly the claims named in `payload.claims`, no more, for exactly `payload.validitySeconds`, no longer.

Issuance is **high-trust**: a VTA **MUST** gate this task behind operator **step-up** (an elevated authentication assurance level, see [`auth/step-up/approve-response`](../../../../auth/step-up/approve-response/0.1/spec.md)). The operator-signed step-up response is the unforgeable human authorization; this task is the instruction that step-up authorizes.

The credential's claim vocabulary is opaque to the framework — the issuing authority and the eventual verifier agree on its meaning. The issued credential is itself a standard Verifiable Credential and is verified, presented, and (optionally) revoked by the usual means.

Certain `credentialType` values name a **claims profile** defined by this specification: for those types, `payload.claims` is no longer opaque but MUST satisfy the profile's shape and rules (see [Claims profiles](#claims-profiles)). One profile is defined so far: `GovernancePolicyCredential`, which turns this task into the issuance leg of *governance policy as a credential* — a domain's governing parameters attested by the VTA so that enforcement components load policy out of the credential and attestations cite a `policyHash` whose issuance chain a verifier can check.

## Status of this Document

This is a **draft** *Trust Task specification* per [SPEC.md §5.3](/SPEC.md#53-maturity-levels); the schema **MAY** change without notice. Feedback via the [issue tracker](https://github.com/trustoverip/dtgwg-trust-tasks-tf/issues).

## Conformance

[[RFC2119]](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119) and [[RFC8174]](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) key-word conventions apply.

A conforming **producer** (the issuing authority) **MUST**:

1. Emit a *Trust Task document* whose `type` is `https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1`, with itself as `issuer` and the VTA as `recipient`.
2. Populate `payload.holder` with the recipient DID, `payload.claims` with a non-empty object of the claims to attest, and `payload.validitySeconds` with the desired lifetime.
3. Include a `proof` member per [SPEC.md §4.7](/SPEC.md#47-proof).

A conforming **consumer** (the VTA) **MUST**:

1. Validate the document per [SPEC.md §7.2](/SPEC.md#72-consumer-requirements) and verify the `proof`.
2. Refuse the operation unless the caller has satisfied operator step-up; otherwise respond with `vta/credentials/issue:stepUpRequired`.
3. Refuse with `vta/credentials/issue:scopeEmpty` when `payload.claims` is empty, and with `vta/credentials/issue:validityTooLong` when `payload.validitySeconds` exceeds its configured maximum.
4. Mint a Verifiable Credential whose `credentialSubject.id` is `payload.holder`, whose claims are `payload.claims`, with `validFrom = now` and `validUntil = now + validitySeconds`, signed by the issuing context's key.
5. Persist a record keyed by the returned `credentialId` so the credential can be revoked ([`vta/credentials/revoke`](../../revoke/0.1/spec.md)) and audited, and return the `#response` document.
6. When `payload.credentialType` names a claims profile defined below, enforce that profile's additional rules; refuse a violation with `vta/credentials/issue:profileViolation`.

## Definitions

* **Issuing authority.** The party instructing issuance; identified by `issuer`. Typically a context admin.
* **VTA.** The agent that holds the signing key and mints the credential; identified by `recipient`.
* **Holder.** The party the credential is issued to; identified by `payload.holder` (becomes `credentialSubject.id`).
* **Claims.** An opaque object of attested statements — the *scope* of the share.
* **Step-up.** An elevated authentication assurance level satisfied by an operator-signed approval (see related task).

## Request

A *request* document carries `type: https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1` with a payload that validates against the top-level schema in `payload.schema.json`.

### Issue a scoped share to a holder in another context

```json
{
  "id": "9c2f1a7e-3b44-4e9a-8c21-0f5b2d6a1e90",
  "type": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1",
  "issuer": "did:web:vta.example",
  "recipient": "did:web:vta.example",
  "issuedAt": "2026-06-24T10:00:00Z",
  "payload": {
    "holder": "did:key:z6Mkwork-domain-agent",
    "credentialType": "ScopedShareCredential",
    "claims": {
      "share": {
        "from": "finance",
        "fields": ["invoiceTotal", "dueDate"]
      }
    },
    "validitySeconds": 3600,
    "purpose": "Let the work domain reference this month's invoice total."
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022",
    "verificationMethod": "did:web:vta.example#key-1",
    "created": "2026-06-24T10:00:00Z",
    "proofPurpose": "authentication",
    "proofValue": "z3kg..."
  }
}
```

The VTA returns the minted credential and its `credentialId` in the response.

## Response

A *response* document carries `type: https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1#response` with a payload validating against the `Response` definition in `payload.schema.json`.

```json
{
  "id": "1b7d4c90-5e21-4a83-b1f6-2c9e7a30d845",
  "type": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1#response",
  "issuer": "did:web:vta.example",
  "recipient": "did:web:vta.example",
  "issuedAt": "2026-06-24T10:00:01Z",
  "threadId": "9c2f1a7e-3b44-4e9a-8c21-0f5b2d6a1e90",
  "payload": {
    "credentialId": "urn:uuid:c0ffee00-1234-4abc-9def-0123456789ab",
    "expiresAt": "2026-06-24T11:00:01Z",
    "credential": {
      "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2"],
      "id": "urn:uuid:c0ffee00-1234-4abc-9def-0123456789ab",
      "type": ["VerifiableCredential", "ScopedShareCredential"],
      "issuer": "did:web:vta.example",
      "validFrom": "2026-06-24T10:00:01Z",
      "validUntil": "2026-06-24T11:00:01Z",
      "credentialSubject": {
        "id": "did:key:z6Mkwork-domain-agent",
        "share": { "from": "finance", "fields": ["invoiceTotal", "dueDate"] }
      },
      "proof": { "type": "DataIntegrityProof", "cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022", "proofValue": "z..." }
    }
  }
}
```

## Claims profiles

A claims profile binds a `credentialType` value to a required `claims` shape and to additional issuance rules. Profiles keep this task *one* task: the minting mechanism, the step-up gate, the persistence and revocation contract are all unchanged — a profile only constrains what a conforming consumer accepts as `claims` for that type, exactly as a schema-carrying endorsement type does in [`vtc/endorsements/issue`](../../../../vtc/endorsements/issue/0.1/spec.md). A `credentialType` that names no profile remains fully opaque, as before.

### GovernancePolicyCredential

**Intent.** A domain's governance policy — the parameters an enforcement component (e.g. an LLM gateway) applies to traffic it handles: model allowlist, budget caps, upstream pin, privacy tier — attested by the VTA instead of read from a host-editable file. An attestation then cites `claims.policyHash`, and a verifier checks the chain: *this hash is a policy the VTA issued for this domain and has not revoked.* The trust root for policy moves off the enforcing host.

When `payload.credentialType` is `GovernancePolicyCredential`:

1. `payload.claims` MUST validate against the `GovernancePolicyClaims` definition in `payload.schema.json`: `domain` (REQUIRED), `policy` (REQUIRED — the complete governing parameter document, opaque to the framework), `policyHash` (REQUIRED — a multibase-encoded multihash over the JCS [RFC 8785] canonicalization of `policy`), plus optional `contextId` and `policyMediaType`.
2. The consumer MUST recompute `policyHash` from `claims.policy` and refuse a mismatch with `vta/credentials/issue:profileViolation`. A credential whose hash does not commit to its own embedded policy would let an attestation cite one policy while the enforcing component loads another.
3. **Single-active rule.** At most one unexpired, unrevoked `GovernancePolicyCredential` exists per `(contextId, domain)`. Issuing a successor MUST atomically revoke the predecessor (per [`vta/credentials/revoke`](../../revoke/0.1/spec.md) semantics, recorded as a supersession) and return its id as `supersedes` in the response — the same displaced-id auditability that [`policy/activate`](../../../../policy/activate/0.1/spec.md) provides via `previousPolicyId`. Rotation is therefore one task invocation, not an issue-then-revoke pair the operator can half-complete.
4. **Published revocation.** The minted credential MUST carry a `credentialStatus` entry (e.g. W3C Bitstring Status List) resolvable *without authenticating to the issuing VTA*, and revocation MUST be effected by publishing the corresponding status flip. Third parties verify attestations that cite this credential; a revocation only the issuer can observe is invisible exactly where it matters. This adopts the revocation mechanics of [`vtc/endorsements/issue`](../../../../vtc/endorsements/issue/0.1/spec.md) (published slot, never reclaimed) without adopting that family's community-governance plane — the profile promise attaches to this `credentialType`, not to the task URI, so untyped shares are unaffected.
5. **Distribution is presentation, not a new task.** The VTA holds the credentials it mints under this profile and answers [`credential-exchange/query`](../../../../credential-exchange/query/0.1/spec.md) for them (DCQL `type_values: ["GovernancePolicyCredential"]`, optionally constrained by `domain`), presenting via [`credential-exchange/present`](../../../../credential-exchange/present/0.1/spec.md). An enforcing component fetches the current policy for a domain it serves as an ordinary pre-trusted verifier; no dedicated fetch task exists, deliberately.
6. **Consumption.** The enforcing component MUST load its runtime policy from `claims.policy` of a credential it has verified (signature, validity window, status, `domain` binding) and MUST fail closed — refuse traffic for the domain — when no such credential is obtainable. Falling back to local configuration reintroduces the host-resident policy this profile exists to retire.

`validitySeconds` SHOULD be bounded (hours-to-days, not months): expiry is the backstop that limits how long a stale cached status list can keep a superseded policy citable.

### Issue a domain's governance policy

```json
{
  "id": "5f0a2c61-9d7e-4b3a-8f12-6c4d0e9b7a33",
  "type": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vta/credentials/issue/0.1",
  "issuer": "did:web:vta.example",
  "recipient": "did:web:vta.example",
  "issuedAt": "2026-07-29T09:00:00Z",
  "payload": {
    "holder": "did:web:gateway.example",
    "credentialType": "GovernancePolicyCredential",
    "claims": {
      "domain": "did:web:acme.example",
      "contextId": "ctx-acme",
      "policy": {
        "modelAllowlist": ["claude-fable-5", "claude-sonnet-4-5"],
        "budget": { "usdPerDay": 250 },
        "upstream": "https://llm.upstream.example",
        "privacyTier": "restricted"
      },
      "policyHash": "zQmThmKmkDFN67rk4bc46aAyaqDfgy7P4ZmvYFNAuJhnWBd"
    },
    "validitySeconds": 86400,
    "purpose": "Rotate acme's LLM gateway governance policy (budget raise approved in change CR-1182)."
  },
  "proof": {
    "type": "DataIntegrityProof",
    "cryptosuite": "eddsa-jcs-2022",
    "verificationMethod": "did:web:vta.example#key-1",
    "created": "2026-07-29T09:00:00Z",
    "proofPurpose": "authentication",
    "proofValue": "z9dw..."
  }
}
```

The response carries the minted credential (whose `credentialSubject` embeds the claims above and whose `credentialStatus` names the published status-list slot) and, because a policy was already active for `(ctx-acme, did:web:acme.example)`, the displaced credential's id in `supersedes`.

## Security & Privacy

**Free text.** `purpose` is the one member of this payload whose content nothing
constrains, and it is now bounded at 1024 characters — the corpus figure for
operator prose recorded for audit. It is OPTIONAL. It is authored by the caller
requesting issuance, not by the VTA that signs the credential, so it is
**untrusted**: it is not a claim, it does not appear in the issued credential's
`credentialSubject`, and a surface that renders it MUST attribute it to the
requesting caller. Its readers are the VTA's audit log and whoever later reads
that log — which is to say the *recipient party* is expected to **retain** it
for as long as it retains the issuance record, because recording why a
credential was minted is the whole reason the member exists. A caller MUST NOT
use it to carry material the auditor is not entitled to see; "rotate acme's
gateway policy, change CR-1182" is the intended register, and anything about a
person belongs in the claims where the exposure declaration can reach it.
