---
slug: git-trust/revoke
version: "0.1"
title: Git Trust — Revoke Commit-Signing Trust
summary: A community operator revokes a member's commit-signing grant; the host marks the TRQP tuple unauthorized (retained for audit) so CI verifiers observe the denial on their next query.
status: draft
targetFrameworkVersion: "0.5.0"
category: governance
keywords:
  - git
  - commit-signing
  - capability
  - revoke
  - trust-registry
authors:
  - Glenn Gore (https://github.com/stormer78)
parties:
  - role: Community operator
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: issuer
  - role: Community governance host
    requirement: REQUIRED
    member: recipient
proofRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: Revocation is delivery- and audit-critical; it changes what CI enforcement answers and must carry transport-independent integrity.
issuedAtRequirement:
  requirement: REQUIRED
  rationale: Revoking commit-signing trust, replayed after the signer has been trusted again, removes the new trust instead of the old. Verification decisions are read from whichever record survives, so the ordering the timestamp supplies is load-bearing.
sideEffects:
  level: mutating
  rationale: "Marks the grant tuple unauthorized; the record is retained for audit, not deleted."
exposure:
  discloses: metadata
  actsAsSubject: false
errorCodes:
  - code: git-trust/revoke:notGranted
    meaning: No active grant exists for this subject and resource.
    retryable: false
related:
  - git-trust/grant
  - registry/authorization
---

## Abstract

The **Git Trust — Revoke** Trust Task withdraws a member's commit-signing
grant. The *community governance host* marks the grant's TRQP tuple
`authorized: false` rather than deleting it, so the revocation is itself
auditable; a CI verifier's next
[`registry/authorization`](../../../registry/authorization/0.2/spec.md)
query for that tuple answers `authorized: false`.

Note the scope semantics: verifiers configured with an org fallback treat a
grant as `repo OR org`, and the TRQP read contract cannot distinguish an
absent record from an explicit `authorized: false`. Revoking a member's
trust entirely therefore means revoking **every** scope they hold a grant
under (typically the org-wide one).

## Status of this Document

This is a **draft** *Trust Task specification* per [SPEC.md §5.3](/SPEC.md#53-maturity-levels); the schema **MAY** change without notice. Feedback via the [issue tracker](https://github.com/trustoverip/dtgwg-trust-tasks-tf/issues).

## Conformance

[[RFC2119]](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119) and [[RFC8174]](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174) key-word conventions apply.

## Request

The *community operator* (document `issuer`) sends the revocation to the
*community governance host* (document `recipient`) with `subject` and
`resource` (both REQUIRED) and an optional audit `reason`.

### Example request

```json
{
  "subject": "did:webvh:scid123:signer.example.com",
  "resource": "openvtc/openvtc",
  "reason": "Maintainer role ended 2026-07."
}
```

## Response

The *community governance host* (now the `issuer` of the response) replies
with the `#response` document reachable via `$anchor: "response"` in
`payload.schema.json`, echoing `subject` and `resource` and reporting
`revoked` (REQUIRED). `revoked: true` MUST NOT be sent before the tuple is
durably marked unauthorized. Failures use `trust-task-error`, not a
`#response` document.

### Example response

```json
{
  "subject": "did:webvh:scid123:signer.example.com",
  "resource": "openvtc/openvtc",
  "revoked": true
}
```

## Security & Privacy

Revocation is delivery-critical: hosts MUST apply it before acknowledging
(`revoked: true` after durable state, never before), and SHOULD alert when a
revocation cannot be recorded. The retained tuple is anonymously readable
via TRQP, as with all registry records.
